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Mr  Ralf,Dahrendorf 
to the 
Eu:r:"opean  Parliament 
Strasbourg 
13  February  1974 In the past yea:x·  the Members  of the lliu.ropean  Parliament  wa-tched  economic 
developments  in the Community very closely.  Your  Committee  o:n 
Economic  and  Monetary Affairs, in particular,  rendered  a  11wnber  of 
very important  opinions  on policy.  l{y  colleague,  Vice-President 
Haferkamp,  Hho  ·asks you to  accept his apologies· for being absent, 
has  alv~izys  valued. highly these  con:t:dbutions.  As  you know, 
Mr  Ha.ferkamp  i.s in .w:;u~hington a.t  thA- tn(nilent,  l;nki ng  p~n:t  .. in ·tne  ene:rgy. 
conference.  ' 
It has  become  a  well-established practice· to give you,  at the beginning 
of  each yea;r,  an outline of -the  economic  and  financial  E;i tuation in the 
Corrununi ty.  Revietving last year's developments  and discussing the 
outlook for 1974 is no  easy m<:.tter  this ·time.  Never  have  the  clouds 
lm-rerod  co  IT;enaoingly  over Europe  as  nov1 ..  '.Phe  oil crisis has  changed 
the  fraJT!Otvork  for  economic development  in the member  countries  and 
also in r.1ost  countries outside the  Community  o  It came.  too  late to 
have  much  of an impact  on the figures  for 1973,  but in 1974  its 
effects will have  serious implications for production,  employment, 
pri  oes · and  the payments  ba.lcu1ces  in the  Community. 
* 
*  * 
In his  annual  roviti~v a  year ago,  :M:r  Haferkamp  gave you ·an outline of 
economic dovelopments  in the  enlarged  Community  in 1973  and  in 
particular predicted tho.t  economic  growth  WJUld  gather· additional 
momentum.  His  prediction proved  correct. 
Re~l gro8s  Community  product  rose by  5·7%  which  was·  even faster than 
had been forecast  in January 1973.  This  was  the highest rate of 
growth  since 1969.  All  the  Community  countries shared in the 
~·xpa,..'1P.iorq  real gror.::s  national  product  probably rose by  some  7%  in 
Ireland  and  Luxembourg,  by  about  G%  in France,  Belgium  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  by  'Yil·%  in Germa.YJY  cU'1cl  Italy,  and  by  5%  in Denmark. 
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Only  in the Netherlands did growth  remain unchanged  at 4%. 
· In 1973  as  a  whole  employment  also rose further in the  Community. 
Even  so  unemployment  figt.tres  in· mo.st  member  countries  are higher than 
0. 
in similar phases 'Of earlier business  cycles.  Supply  and  demand  on 
the labour market  are not  in balance.  :Z:ndeed  for certain categories 
of workers,  the situation has  de:teriorated;  this is particularly truo 
ofyoung people  looking for their first  jobs.  Nor  has  the drive to 
combat  regional  unemployment  produced  satisfactory results so  far. 
·And it would  also be  a  mistake to dismiss  as unimportant  the fact that 
towards  the  end  of.the year the labour market  situation deteriorated 
in several member· countries. 
However,  what  is most  disturbing,  to  I1\Y  mind,  is that 1973  was  the 
sixth successive yeo:r  of accelerating inflation in the Community. 
Consumer  prices  climbed  by  some  8.5%,  the highest  ret.te  ever recorded. 
This  overall figure fol"  the  Community  masks  divergingtrends in the 
vario~s countries:  the increase ranged  from  6%  in Luxembourg  to 
11 v5%  in Ireland.o 
The  u..},)t;urge  in pY'iC~S is p~:rot  o£  a,  gene~a.l,  t-mrlcl-t-Jidc  movement  and 
is by  no  r.teans  confined to  the  Community.  t·le  have  to  go  back to tha 
time  of the war  in Korea  to find  a  per·iod  when  inflation was  progro3sing 
on  such  a  wide front as  in 1973. 
Tha  ·mnin  causes  arc: 
./. bl.iijinoss -oycile· 
oountric13;  the rooult of which  was .overstrain 
in the gonc1'al  intorna.tiono.l  eoonorn.r; 
(ii) Tho  uncertain monctury  sj.tuo.tion  and  especially tho devaluation 
-_  of u  m:unber  of curronoics;  this encouraged  speculativB  c~pital 
.  . 
movements;  · 
(iii) Per3istent supply.diffioulties for agricuHural  and.  industrial 
products  and fresh bottlenecks  emerging during. the year.  This: 
led to sharp rises in rm-t  Iantcrial prices. 
(iv)  As  factors Hithin the  Community,  I  would mention habituation 
to inflation and  the tendency for inflationary behaviour to 
become  ingrainedi  the cfforto of the v::;,rious  economic  ancl.  . 
social groups  to  secure l:ighcr raoncy  incomes  and,  above  a:ll, 
the fall-off in productivity gains  towards. the  end of the year. 
Tho  trend of the  Community's  extorn:1.l  balance was  mu.ch  more 
unfavourable  thc:tl'l  previously,  reflecting the deterioration in tho 
terms  of trade of most  member  countrieso  Most  of the increase in 
the  Ccinmunity's  official gold  end foreign exchange reserves  (some 
11  000 million·  EUR,  incl'l.iding S:pocial  Drawing Rights  rmd  tho  reserve 
position in tho Internation.J.l  J.Ioneta.ry  Fund)  tvas  achieved in the 
first throe r..onths  of the year,  i-thile  tovvards  the  end  of the year the 
t ondoncy  vms  d.ownwards. 
Thfs  -vms  the situation when  the oil crisis developed  at  tho  end of the 
your.  Its first main effects arc  a  fur·ther deterioration in the 
terms  of trndc,  CL  ;frer.?l~  wo.ve  of cost  and price increases in the 
Community  a:1d  prezsuro  on  some  Conu11uni ty currencies? ·  this pressure 
wns  felt not  only by  currencies  on  an independent float but  ctlso  by 
currencies in the  Community's  exchange rate scheme,  the  "snake". 
As  you knut·l,  tho dollar•  ha::J  pickod  up  shnrply since  November.  On 
_19  January, ·tho French  Goverment  decided to  suspend for  six months 
obligatory intervention by  the  Banquo  de  France  on  the foreign  exchange 
markets,  thereby lvi thdrawing from  tl".e  joint float  of the European 
Cl1.Tl'CUOi CS • 
.;. very·  ··aeridh.CJ · 
.·. ii1ternational econc·mic  relatione.  Unl:::<SS  oil p:rioen fall below the  J.evcl 
reached at tho end of 1973,  the oil-exporting ootu1trics will :rooeivo very 
large .extra revenues of the order _of  ~60 000 million in  1974.  Tllis will 
:  '  - - -
be matched by an equivalent deterioration 1n the bur:rent  D.ccounts  and  a 
ioss pf real income  in the oil-importing countries.  Special  problenis 
a.riee hero,  particularly as to hovv  the deficits nre to be  finaricod  and, 
qui  ta generally and 4·lorld-ldde,  as to hovl the extra oil revenues are to 
be  investGd.  The  oil-importing developing countries arc also faced i'li  th 
speciel difficulties; the additional burdon placed on  them  in the  form of 
higher oil prices is larger than the public development  aid tliey have  been 
receiving in the past  few years. 
In 1974  the higher cost of oil alone will produce  a  deteriora·l;ion of 
~ 17,500 million iri the  tr£de  and  services account  with  nor~member 
countries.  'As the  Community's  dependence  on  oil imports  from  traditional 
supplier countries will probably continue for  a  lone time  to  como,  this 
additional burden may  increase ·still further in the years ahead.  The  oil 
crisis therefore quite generc.lly raises the problem of the  Cor.ununity's 
energy  supplies.  Oil prices are now  higher then the breclc-even point  for 
other energy  sources.  But  the  substitution t rocoss calla fol'  immediate 
and  su.sta.ined investment  m1d  research efforts. 
It is· ·very  hazardous at the moment  to forecast  the  economic  trend. for the 
Community  in 1974.  Bu·b  there  can be no  doubt  that  we  shall be  faood  vli th 
major  economic  and financ:ial difficulties. 
Already the tentative forecasts made  lest autunm  sugg0stcd that the 
economic  trend would be  less buoyant  in all member  countri-es.  The  oil 
crisis seems to ha:ve  aocelere.ted this process whilethe general uncertc:dnty 
' 
has  increased.  Prudent  and objective analysis puts the growth in real 
Community  product  at bot\veen  2  and  3% 
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. .  ..  ~~~ming t}la.t  th$  ou:rr.ent  le,_bour  cdil:~pu:tq.a  ixl.. :t.ho  Un:\:t13rl.  ~Cine;rloro 
l:io:b  olrbAil.n.rii  und,uly hcavj'  ldssel3  of  p:r:O<lu.c·tion~  The  1rrrp'rovemont 
in tho  cnipJ.oj1::out  si  tutl.tior  ..  recorded in the past  fEl\"1  years  ID€!-Y  be wiPOet 
". 
ou~;  u,:;o.L'1  by tho c.lil'ec.rt  a.1d  indirect effeots of the  o:.l  crisis. 
Other  inG.ustrial:i.zcd ·countries will probably o:...."Perienco  an,  even  sharper 
slmvdown  in the  growth of coonomio  a.ctivi  ty,  In J!lpan 7  for  instarJ,ce, 
economic  gro\vth is -li.kely to be very vlealc,  dlld  the us  economy  will 
probe.bly be  almost  station8,;r'y.  Horld trade.  which  ln  1973  grew by  13% 
in real terms,  is also lD(ely to be distrinctly lesa ·buoyante 
At  tho  same  time  throughout  the Community  the outlook for  pricGs is alarming. 
In no  single  Community  ccuntry will prices increase by  significantly less 
than  10%,,  and  in somo  countri-es the rate vrill  probably be  much  higher still. 
There  is r.,  groat  danger -!;hat  different  economic policies t·Jill  be  !-Jursued 
in thc.various countries.  Sensitivity·to tho  problems .of employment  and 
inflation indoodvarios with the member  country,  as  does  dependence  on  oil 
i~ports 7  and all.the member  countries'  currencies do  not  react  in tho 
sarr.e  iVCIJ'  to  changes in the terms  of trade  2.nd  to  dost0..l>:i J izi1:g mmremcnts 
of mono;y  nnd  capital. 
Moreover,  in tho  nc~v situation there.:  is internationally the greet risk 
of a  return to protection::....,.,,  and honco  o:  a,  disruption of the present . 
system of world  trade. 
Horo 1  I  must  emphasize  tho very high social  cos·b  a:nd  dangers which 
Duc.:1  c,  Gtop  b.:.clCi·mrclrJ  'tlould  ont2Jl for· our .J1()pUlD.tion:J8• 
It \'i'oulc.  mor-.n  joopard.izi:1g the rise in living ste.ncle.rclR. r!hich  NO  have 
enjoyed in tho past  sixteen yoars as  a  result of tho  establishment  of 
tho  Common  I/Iarket  and  tho liberlization of world  ~rado.  We  would  ru:.1 
the risk of creating a  climn,te  of considort:tble  insocw.·i  ty for  companies t 
inver.:tmont  decisions as  inve8tments :policies in the;  p;o:,st  fc1t1  years have 
been  lur:-sely. dotorminco. hy the  at-,IO.ilability  of a  largo market. 
0  D ./.  t- It means.rnore u:nemr>loyrnent. 
···~educing economic.poliqy formulation to the .:nation~l  dimension  wou.lc1 
- oonsiderab1y':i.nc~ease the 'danger cii begear-~ny-neichb~ur nttituc~cs devol  oping 
--:be it that member  countries would  devalue their currencies in ord0r to  ·.  - ·  .. - - ·''  . 
secure  a  c'ompc{itive  edge  on 'international .markets, .be  it the.t  a  strong 
deflationary poli'cy would be pursued for the  same  reason.  In rai,ther  case,. 
the partllDr countries would probably  sooner or later.· resort  to. defensive 
- .  ;·· 
measures  so  that in the end the level  of employm.ent.  \'i'OUld  fall in all  the 
countries concerned. · 
Today  no  single·country could really afford.the outlay on  investment·n.nd 
research needed to develop  quickly new  energy  sources at  costs making the 
operations a· paying proposition;  such an effort is feasible  only Nhen 
supported by  a  large market  c-..nd  a  common  energy policy. 
Simil~rly, in the forthcoming international negotiations with the  oil~· 
producing countries,  the developine  co11nt~ies and the other industrialized 
countries the Governments  of the Europee..n  countries can r.chj.eve  satisfactory 
results for their populations  only if the;y  act  jointly, 
* 
*  * 
The  Comrrtuh'ity  rnust  therfore condentrate u.ll  its efforts on  overcomin~ the 
current crisis, for it represents the greatest chd.longc  the Community  has 
yet  had to face. 
The  danger of a  breakdown of economic relatipns in the Community  prompted 
the  Commission to present  an  er.1ergency  programme  to the .Council  on 23 
January.  In  this'prograr.~me it was  pointecl out that  Nhile the dependence 
of each individual  European country  011  externl'lJ  tre,cle  a.ncl  other externc."ll 
transactions had increased,  no  matching common  policy  ha~ been developed 
to make  the whole  less vulr.erable  t(!  destabilizing influences from  the 
outside,  Thorn  is a  great  dant.:er that Mom1:>cr  States uiJ.l  resort to 
unilaiiera.l  meaSU:res  whose  consequences in economic  Lncl  political terms 
would be  i~6aloul~blo.  This is why  the  Commission believes that the 
.;. .  7 -
cCdunotl  s}'iguld i§tue a :Er~8;tement  ~EI:>r.t):ci>, 1u~:nr~ 'tho ihtentioP. 
· ·.  States to ret',rain from  any  currency  d~valtition cles::i.gned· to  secure 
competitive  ~dva.ntaees and  from  nny  mef',suros  thr..t  resin~iot trade.  The· 
Cow.rniss:i.oi'"l'!-~ould nlso like the :Member  States to consui  t  each other 
cffoctj.vely  ·and on a  ccntinuouE  ··,  basis. on their exchange  l"'ute  policies 
e.l1cl  the measures  h::winc;  o.  direct bearing thereon. 
- - "  - - -
Consultations should be  supplemented by tho  followiniT steps: 
(i) The  Com~nity's credit  rr~echn.nism,  e,djusted·in accordance  with the 
Commission's'propoDals  concerning the.increase in the  quotas  for 
short-term monetary  support,  must  bo_brought  into operation 
irmnedint<nly; 
(ii) 'l'he  Council  should inyi  te the appropriate Communi t.y bodies to work 
out· without  de ley ways  ano.  m0ans. Fhereby funds  available  on the 
interr;n,tional  capital m0rk?ts ._can  be. mobilized in orderly fashion 
in a  .Euro~ean n,ction framowork7 
(iii) The  Council  should invite the Monetary  Committee  CUld  the  Committe 
of G-:>·v--rnors  of Central  BrrJ.m  to  prepure~ immediately  ar;  opinion on 
n.mendri.ent  ·of the rules governing the price at  \·Thich 'gold may  be 
tre,nsferred bet1,-1een  mone-G2.ry  authori  tics \vi thin the Community' and 
at  intern~tion~l level. 
Further  str:Ps.~ave also been tn.ken in the fields of trndo  and ·energy. 
Efforts nre being made  by the  Community to overcome  present diffioulties 
throttf::h  orC.erly  chr:mnels  7  with  2n appron.ch  covering the entire international 
syotor.:.  Applied to moneto,ry  policy this means  th:;1,t  no  country is to 
engage  in competitive  devn.lur.ttion  or to  toJ_<e  other meanur·cs  which  t1re 
tn.l1tE',mount  to unloe1dinr.;  one 1 s  O\V!l  problems  on the neirhbouring countries  • 
..... 
He  should r..lso  look. cr.rc:('ully  into the proposal 'by the Man.-,ging Director 
of tho  Interriationd Monet2,r;'{  Fund  for .the  cr.e2.tion of· new  facili-ties in 
the  IMF  to help mi  ~ic;n.tc the boJance. of peyments' c.1i'sequilH:ria resulting 
from the rise  i'n oil prices.  This  is. not,  of course,  to  sr:y  that \ve 
' .  . 
acc..::pt  the  sudden and c1isproporticn,J,tely  shp,rp  increase in oil prices." 
Concerted c,otion,  to.ken worldwide,  to nvoid a  cl.isorderly  scramble for 
.;. .for international  crecUts  cottld also b_e  very helpful  in the present 
_  si  tttutio:n.  _The  St>eciul 'balo.nce-of-payments  p:roblems facing· tr.o  d0velopil1g 
countries  should also  reooiyo grcnt nttontion internationally.  The  task 
here is to see thd the  il1dustr!alizoc1 col.u1tries  c1o  not .cut b':'l.bk  t:ncir 
development  aid,  nnd to look for \'lays,  through international  cooperation, 
of moving  t0~1arcls  0.  solution of the  specin.l  baln.nce-of-~.yments problems 
experienced by the oil-importing developing countries.  All these 
a.r1•angeme?ts  -vrouldt  of course,  have to be  supplemented by other actions 
which are :i)c>.rt  of Hider inte.rnat.ional  cooperc.tion and are aimed Q.t  finding 
r..  1<'-sting  Rolution to the crisis. 
The  formulo.tion of a  cormnon  energy policy,  the  st~rt of the  Region~l Fund 
and the  tran~i:tion to the  second  stnge of econoi;lic  and monetary univn rr.ust 
now  form  the  centerpiece. of an overe..ll  econofllic policy, but  institutional 
innovation has  an  important  role to play;  this policy must  be  aimed  ~t 
restoring the conditions for bn.L:mced  grovrth  in the  Community  and for 
sustained full  employment. 
It is therefore very regrettable that the I.Iombcr  Sto..tes  should have  fv.iled 
so farto reaoh agreement  on any of these,key issues,  especinlly the 
\ 
transition to the  seconq stage  of econonLc  and monetary union. 
You  will  remember thn.t  vvhile  agreement  e.s  to principle h8.s  been reached on 
the essential proposds for tho  second stage  of  economic  and.  monetary union, 
ndoption of the resolution on the  implementation of the  second stage  of tho 
remaining l_ega:j.  instruments has be.en  shelved for the time being owing to 
disagreement  over the  Regional  Fund. 
understand in the present  situation. 
Such  v.  postponement  is difficult to 
With  regard to the pooling of reserves,  the Council  hn.s  invited the 
Monetary  Committee,  the  Commi~teo of Governors  of Central Bn.nks  end the 
Board of Governors  of the  European !:1oneto.ry  Cooppr.:ttion Fund to· clrmr  up  a 
report by  31  March 1974  o!l  toohnicD.l  problems  still outstnnding,  <.mel.  that 
is all.  Here,  too,  oircumsta.nces  cr,ll for  a.  l:!pecding up· of the dccioion-
making process within the  Coramuni ty. 
* 
*  * 9
In viet-1  of'  the ·  ~j;fficult  si'tuo:tior:.  confronting tho  Conummi ty I  should 
like to repeat  to  ~on the  Commission's  solemn appeal  oJ:  31  J n.nun.ry  on 
the  St1.t0  of th<:r  t:·ommu:nit~"• 
Any  return to  ii~dependcnt ne.tionul  polic:i.es in tl:e  economic and monetary 
fiolC.:s,  ['.8  in any  othe!' fielcl,  involves the greatest ·risks forthe 
Community  and hence  for the  re0,l  incomes,  jobs nnd living st'111dards  of 
its pcpul.::.tion. 